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Abstract
This paper combines incumbency advantage and political budget cycle theory.
An opportunistic politician is given two instruments: deficit-financed transfers and
propaganda. Unlike earlier analytical models, but in accordance with the empiri-
cal literature, government manipulations do actually improve re-election chances.
However, the optimal level of government manipulation depends on country char-
acteristics, in particular the competence dispersion among potential candidates.
This may explain why it is easier to detect political budget cycles in, for instance,
developing countries or new democracies. Results are robust to alternative com-
petence distribution and propaganda cost assumptions.
JEL classification: D72, E32, H62, (E62, D83)
Keywords: political business cycle; deficit bias; fiscal policy; disinformation;
near-rationality; behavioural macroeconomics.
∗Institute for Management Research, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen,
The Netherlands, phone: +31-24-36-15507, fax: +31-24-36-12379, email: f.bohn@fm.ru.nl.
I Introduction
Recent empirical research suggests that political budget cycles can only be observed in
particular country groups or countries with specific characteristics: developing countries
(Block, 2002, Schuknecht, 1996 and 2000, Shi and Svensson, 2006, and Vergne, 2009);
new democracies (Brender and Drazen, 2005); or countries with low levels of fiscal or
government transparency or media freedom (Alt and Lassen (2006), Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya (2004), and Veiga, Veiga and Morozumi (2017), respectively). Surveys on
the literature on ”context-conditional cycles” are provided by Francese (2002) and de
Haan and Klomp (2013a). As a common feature, all these papers observe (explicitly or
implicitly) that political budget cycles are smaller or non-existent in established OECD
democracies – an issue to be picked up later on in this paper.
In the model-theoretic literature, two types of information asymmetries have been sug-
gested to rationalise budgetary manipulations in opportunistic political cycle models.
First, in papers in the tradition of Rogoff (1990) policymakers know about their own
competence before it is revealed to voters who face an adverse selection problem. By
expanding the public goods provision policymakers can send to voters a more positive
signal about their competence, with the intention of increasing their re-election chances.
Second, papers along the lines of Shi and Svensson (2006) model a pure moral hazard
story, instead. (In Lohmann (1998), a similar model can be found for monetary policy
manipulations.) The incumbent cannot use an informational advantage to signal compe-
tence, because neither politicians nor voters can observe the current competence level of
the government. However, since part of the electorate is uninformed, the incumbent has
an incentive to expand fiscal policy in order to appear as competent as possible, thereby
increasing her re-election chances.
Both approaches, signalling and moral hazard, can explain political budget cycles. To
my knowledge there is, however, no paper of either tradition which allows policymakers
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to expand the share of votes, systematically, in equilibrium. Political manipulations
affect the economy, but do not, on average, achieve the intended increase in the chance
of political survival. This does, however, contradict empirical evidence presented by, for
instance, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) and de Haan
and Klomp (2013b) who find that politico-economic machinations positively influence
re-election chances – another issue to be picked up in this paper later on. Boylan (2008)
and Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) even find evidence for a ”close election bias”, i.e. that
government manipulations increase, if the election is closely contested.
This paper presents a political budget cycle model in the Lohmann (1998) and Shi
and Svensson (2006) tradition, though with significant modifications. Voters are either
informed or uninformed about the budget deficit as in Shi and Svensson. However,
uninformed voters cannot form rational expectations because they are susceptible to
government disinformation (henceforth also propaganda).1 Uninformed voters are na¨ıve
in that disinformation by the government lowers their deficit perception. Instead of pro-
viding a signalling model based on propaganda that results in an incumbency advantage
as in Caselli et al. (2014), we use propaganda as government instrument that can di-
rectly affect the beliefs of some voters. This is a simplifying assumption, but this paper
does not seek to explain theoretically the empirically existing incumbency advantage.
Instead, it combines the information-provision advantage the incumbent has with polit-
ical budget cycle theory. If the incumbency advantage can be used for influencing voter
perception, we can explain the aforementioned empirical finding of increasing re-election
chances due to politico-economic machinations. Moreover, the model suggests another
empirical phenomenon (to be discussed further down) which may help explain why we
1 Disinformation is not unintentional misinformation, i.e. incorrect information. Instead, disinfor-
mation can be defined as the deliberate and malicious dissemination of false or misleading information.
The term propaganda has a slightly different meaning and is typically preferred when the purpose of
influencing a large number of people is stressed. Nonetheless, this paper uses the terms disinformation
and propaganda synonymously. For a discussion of occurrence and relevance of disinformation, see
Section II.
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do not find political budget cycles in advanced OECD democracies.
Similar to Alesina and Roubini with Cohen (1997) this paper argues that if the govern-
ment can appear more competent by raising the level of government spending, then it
should appear even more competent, if it could convince (at least some) voters of being
able to do so without incurring large deficits. In the model, the incumbent can, there-
fore, use two instruments for appearing more competent. Increasing the deficit allows the
government to expand transfers which are appreciated by voters. Raising propaganda
reduces the deficit perception and makes voters less aware of the deficit problem. The
use of both instruments is limited because there are deficit repayment costs as well as
costs for deceiving voters. The opposition, independent research institutes, the press
and the (social) media may counteract the government machinations. In the literature,
it is argued, however, that there is an incumbency advantage, i.e. that there is a per se
advantage from being an incumbent rather than a challenger. This advantage may arise
from having an edge in the use of propaganda. Evidence on the incumbency advantage
for elections and the role of media coverage are discussed in Section II. It may be costly
to disinform voters, but the government will typically be able to stir the public opinion
in the desired direction.2
Giving the government a fiscal as well as a disinformation instrument for improving re-
election chances reverses some of the previous theoretical results in the literature. In
particular, it can be shown that governments’ winning chances can be increased by their
manipulation efforts – as suggested in empirical papers by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya
(2004), Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011), de Haan and Klomp (2013b). In addition and
as a consequence thereof, it can also be shown that the optimal level of government
manipulation depends on country characteristics, in particular the competence dispersion
2 There are also many examples for successful propaganda in the political domain, even in today’s
world. Take, for instance, the public opinion in Russia (with respect to the ”legitimacy” of the annex-
ation of the Crimean peninsula) or in Turkey (with regard to the role of the Kurdish ”insurgency”, the
role of the Gu¨len movement in the 2016 coup, or the need for a presidential system).
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among potential candidates. The intuitive (positive) link – as obtained by Shi and
Svensson (2006) – between increasing the share of uninformed voters on the one hand
and reinforced budget and deficit cycles on the other hand does not hold unambiguously
any longer. In Section IV, it is shown that an increase in uninformed voters does not
lead to magnified cycles, if incumbents are drawn from a pool of politicians with very
similar competence levels. This holds for alternative standard distributions (Normal,
Laplace and triangular).
The paper then goes one step further. Based on anecdotal and empirical evidence on
real world competence distributions presented in Section II, it is argued that more dis-
persed competence distributions can be associated with developing countries and new
democracies, more condensed competence distributions with established OECD democ-
racies. This implies (and is a testable prediction of this paper) that developing countries
and new democracies should exhibit larger variations in cycles for similar variations in
information dispersion between countries, i.e. for similar variations in the shares of un-
informed voters across countries. If the variation in the magnitude of cycles is larger
in non-OECD democracies, then it might be easier to detect political budget cycles at
least in some developing countries or new democracies. This paper may, therefore, help
explain why political budget cycles are rarely found in established OECD democracies,
but often in developing countries and new democracies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 completes the empirical
picture with respect to model assumptions and interpretations. It discusses the relevance
of disinformation and incumbency advantage, which are key assumptions of the model.
It also shows that competence distributions differ for different country groups, which
matters for the aforementioned interpretation of the results. Section 3 presents a simple
model combining political budget manipulations with propaganda (with details provided
in the appendix). Disinformation is costly in terms of reputation costs occurring after
elections. However, the model results do not differ, qualitatively, to those obtained in an
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alternative model (not presented here) which captures contemporaneous disinformation
costs to be paid out of the budget. In Section 4, several propositions are derived (with
indications for the proofs provided in the appendix) and related to results previously
obtained in the literature. The results are then reviewed under some standard distri-
butional assumptions for competence; empirical implications are discussed. Section 5
concludes.
II Empirical Relevance of Assumptions and Results
This paper is a theoretical contribution, but argues that its assumptions and interpreta-
tions are based on real world phenomena. In particular, three aspects will be stressed.
First, the occurrence of disinformation, also in the form of forecast manipulation, will be
documented; and their link to rational behaviour will be discussed. Second, the key in-
cumbency advantage assumption will be empirically justified and linked to the signalling
model by Caselli et al. (2014). Third, empirical evidence will be presented to support
the link between compressed competence distributions and established OECD democ-
racies on the one hand and more dispersed competence distributions and developing
countries/new democracies on the other hand. The latter will be needed for interpreting
Proposition 3.
II.A Disinformation, Forecasts and Rationality
It seems plausible that a government, which is willing to use fiscal policy for manipu-
lating the whole economy, would a fortiori also be willing to foster the dissemination of
false or misleading information. But is government disinformation in the context of fiscal
policy empirically relevant? And if so, is it theoretically feasible that such disinforma-
tion affects the political budget cycle? As for the empirical aspect, Lipford (2001) is – to
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my knowledge – the first one to clearly distinguish two issues. First, there is a general
tendency of governments – at all times – to present the state of fiscal affairs in an overly
optimistic light. She quotes Brennan and Buchanan (1980), according to whom ”politi-
cians will want to overestimate the benefits of government programs and underestimate
the current and future taxes required to pay for those programs.”3 Second, there is a
specific inclination during election years to produce even more optimistic public finance
forecasts. She cites, for instance, Miller (1994) and Alesina and Roubini with Cohen
(1997) who argue that the government may deliberately want to misinform the public
about the true state of the budget in an election year, thereby justifying higher transfers
or expenditures to raise its re-election chances.
The government’s attempt to use public and/or research agencies to misrepresent the
fiscal situation in a country is called ”electoral forecast cycles” by Bru¨ck and Stephan
(2006). Boylan (2008) argues that, in particular prior to elections, revenue forecasts are
based on favourable estimates of the macroeconomic environment and unrealistic growth
assumptions. As a consequence, pre-election budgets are overly optimistic, thus resulting
in unexpected deficits. His panel data analysis for all 50 US states reveals significant
coefficients for the underreporting of pre-election deficit figures. Krause and Corder
(2007) claim that ”less stable [US federal] agencies are more likely to accommodate
political pressures for forecast optimism”. There is also strong evidence for manipulations
in other OECD countries, but also some mixed evidence.4 The sovereign debt and
3 There is plenty of supporting, but also some mixed evidence. General ”budget propaganda” is
already reported by Porritt (1910) for early twentieth century England. Blackley and DeBoer (1993)
claim that there is a ”substantial bias in outlay proposals”, but not in economic forecasts or revenue
estimates for US federal budgets prior to 1989. In contrast, Boylan (2008) finds biases in forecasts for an
array of US state budget variables from 1982 to 2005 and attributes them to both economic and political
factors. This is confirmed by Lehmann and Jochimsen (2017) for a sample of 18 OECD countries. They
find that left-wing and less fragmented governments produce more optimistic tax revenue forecasts; they
do, however, not find any evidence for political budget cycles. Buettner and Kauder (2015) argue that
external experts can (at least in Germany) not prevent the government from exerting influence on tax
revenue forecasts.
4 Heinemann (2006) contributes evidence for official forecasts of Germany’s federal budget from 1969
to 2003. His results support the idea that deficit forecasts are more optimistic prior to elections. Similar,
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banking crisis in the Eurozone revealed successful government attempts to manipulate
the international public’s perception of a country’s fiscal situation. Greece and other
European countries cheated to hide ”excessive” public debt and/or deficits so that they
could gain access to the European Monetary Union and/or fulfill the criteria laid out
by the European Stability and Growth Pact. To my knowledge no econometric study
has been conducted for developing countries yet, but Kyobe and Danninger (2005) claim
that discretionary adjustments of forecast figures are certainly not uncommon.5 All
the aforementioned evidence suggests that many governments try to influence budget
perceptions and forecasts more or less directly, especially prior to elections.
According to the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet, 1785; Grofman, Owen and Feld,
1983; Myerson, 1998) the ”correct” decision can be reached with a high probability (un-
der fairly mild assumptions on the distribution of information), even if voters receive
imprecise signals. With disinformation, i.e. deliberate misinformation, the situation is
different; the government tries to skew the information distribution in its own favour.
Disinformation can produce distortions, even if agents are fully rational. Eichenberger
(1996) argues that incorrect (”dirty”) information increases the variance and has ”sys-
tematic effects at the aggregate level” because of asymmetries in ”political decision-
making processes”. Congleton (2001) discusses biased rational expectations, especially
in cases when not all possibilities are known explicitly (”the dimensionality of the event
space is, itself, to be learned”). Ursprung (1994) finds that a government can influence
though weaker evidence is obtained for German states by Bischoff and Gohout (2010). Couture and
Imbeau (2009) find evidence for a pre-election revenue bias (in Canadian provinces from 1986-2004),
Paleologou (2005) for a pre-election expenditure and revenue, but not for a deficit bias (for UK budget
forecasts from 1969 to 1995). Ohlsson and Vredin (1996) encounter partisan, but no electoral effects
(for Swedish data from 1969 to 1993). Evidence for pre-election budget balance errors in EU member
countries is found by von Hagen (2010). Bru¨ck and Stephan (2006) even suggest that the euro zone
Stability and Growth Pact has spurred electoral forecast cycles.
5 They report on the revenue forecasting practices in 34 low-income countries. Their study is based
on a questionnaire circulated to IMF fiscal economists in 2003. While most countries score low on
the quality and the accountability of the forecasting process, discretionary adjustments seem to be
particularly severe in countries with low levels of governance.
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an uninformed, but rational electorate to some degree. If, however, we are willing to
acknowledge that not all voters deal with manipulated information in a fully rational
way6 (especially when it comes to deficits and other fiscal variables), the effect measured
by Ursprung (1994) should be even larger. In addition, even if voters anticipate that
governments try to misrepresent fiscal data, governments seem to particularly increase
their efforts prior to elections. Would all voters anticipate that? How would voters know
that they should trust ”stable agencies” (who might be more independent) more than
less stable ones (Krause and Corder, 2007)? In a country where the media are controlled
by the government, many people suspect government disinformation, but will all voters
be able to rationally anticipate the correct degree of disinformation? If they could, why
should censorship and media control be such an important issue, especially in developing
countries and new democracies?7
II.B Incumbency Advantage and Signalling
The incumbency advantage has empirically been confirmed in numerous papers (more re-
cently by Freier, 2015), even though it does not apply to all circumstances (Ade, Freier,
Odendahl, 2014; da Fonseca, 2015). The advantage has often been linked to media
6 Caplan (2002, 2006) reports strong evidence that non-economists hold very different beliefs from
economists (who are trained in rational expectations), thereby suggesting that agents hold biased be-
liefs on the economy and economic policies. Based on the ”Survey of Americans and Economists on
the Economy” he rejects the hypothesis that the measurable differences in beliefs between economists
and the general public can be explained by the economists’ self-serving bias, i.e. their socio-economic
background.
7 In democratic countries this may also work against the government. During the recent 2016 Brexit
referendum in the UK, disinformation played a significant role (e.g. the false claim that EU membership
costs the UK £350m a week; the insinuation that the UK could get out of the EU in order to prevent
migration while remaining in the common market). Hetherington (1996) suggests that the US media
were undermining Bush’s re-election bid by ”Forming Voters’ National Economic Evaluations in 1992”.
– Press empires play a significant role in determining public opinion: Murdoch’s papers during the
Brexit campaign; Berlusconi’s media during his own time in office and thereafter (see also Durante and
Knight, 2009). Media capture is analysed by Besley and Prat (2006). The literature on mass media is
surveyed by Prat and Stro¨mberg (2011).
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coverage and applies even if the media are not (fully) controlled by the government. In-
cumbents get more media attention (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1987) and are (therefore)
better known and more positively evaluated (Abramowitz, 1980). Hinckley (1980) and
Ragsdale (1981) find that incumbents are more visible in the media than challengers.
When the seat is open, ie. no incumbent running, there is, overall, more media coverage
according to Kahn (1991). Iyengar, Peters and Kinder (1982) show experimentally that
it is possible to influence the weight voters give to certain topics (priming) and then
affect their voting by focussing media coverage on those topics. Prior (2006) argues that
local TV stations broadcast material for the incumbent at below market costs. This
makes propaganda costlier for the challenger.
In Kartik (2009) lying is also costly, but his model studies the strategic interaction be-
tween the sender and the receiver of false information (as pioneered by Crawford and
Sobel, 1982). The (relatively small) literature on disinformation in political economy
games focuses more specifically on the interaction between incumbents and voters; pro-
paganda is used to affect agents’ perceptions and thus the probability of appropriating a
given rent. Ursprung (1994), for instance, models a propaganda campaign by competing
interest groups. In Austen-Smith (1987) candidates use campaign expenditures to affect
their perceived position. A disinformation technology is drawn upon and probabilistic
voting is applied to determine the optimal investment in disinformation. Ursprung (1994)
finds that ”the electorate can be influenced [by disinformation] to a certain degree.” In
Congleton (1986) the voter perception can be affected by the number of repetitions of
certain messages.
Based on the evidence on media coverage Caselli et al. (2014) assume that only the
incumbent can send a signal which is interpreted as propaganda. The incumbent tries
to raise her perceived competence (or ”talent” or ”quality” as referred to in their paper)
above the average, i.e. the challenger’s expected competence. Rational voters cannot
be fooled on average. But because signals are sent specifically when incumbents are of
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medium quality and hence close to the re-election threshold, there is an incumbency
advantage on average. This paper differs in that there is no signalling. However, the
incumbent behaves as the medium quality incumbents in Caselli et al. (2014); she does
send a sort of disinformation signal to voters. In both papers, a (medium quality)
incumbent can effectively influence voters’ beliefs of her competence and, thereby, raise
her re-election probability. Caselli et al. provide a rational expectations explanation
for improving re-election chances by using (propaganda) signals. However, it is this
paper that justifies such electoral success based on manipulations in the context of a
political (budget) cycle model. This can only be achieved because the fiscal instrument
is augmented with a propaganda instrument which produces an incumbency effect.
II.C Competence Distributions in Different Country
Groups
The interpretation of Proposition 3 on the effects of changing the share of disinformed
voters depends upon the distribution of competence in the pool of candidates. There
are different arguments that could be made on the selection of politicians in different
countries or country groups. If money is the major determinant for politicians to choose
their job, then one would suspect that less corrupt (Western) countries should bring forth
low competence politicians because more competent politicians face larger opportunity
costs. In more corrupt countries, it might be more worthwhile to become a politician
for highly competent individuals because of rent extraction possibilities. One could
also make an argument about the link between competence and the education level of
politicians.
However, what matters for this paper is not the average level of competence, but the dis-
persion of competence. Is the competence level in the pool of candidates very diverse?
In the UK many politicians of the major parties studied at Oxford or Cambridge; in
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France they typically attended a Grande Ecole. Although similar education does not
necessarily result in similar competence, it does hint at it given that these politicians
acquire similar skills and abilities. In contrast, government competence may be more
dispersed in developing countries and new democracies where power and personal rela-
tionships largely influence who can become a politician. When voters are susceptible to
populism, one could also speculate that the competence of potential politicians is more
dispersed.
This paper argues that we can use the change over time of two Worldwide Governance
Indicators by the World Bank (2016) as a proxy for competence dispersion. Government
Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services and policies; Regula-
tory Quality depicts perceptions of government policies and regulation which promote
private sector development. The levels of both variables would not say much about gov-
ernment competence, but it can be argued that changes over time reflect the influence
of competent or incompetent politicians on the functioning of the government. Hence
lower standard deviations (s.d.s) indicate less variation in regulatory quality and gov-
ernment effectiveness. Table 1 comprises comparisons of averages for country groups;
disaggregated s.d.s are reported in Appendix A. Let us interpret the results. For indi-
vidual countries one could argue that regulatory quality and/or government effectiveness
change over time for country-specific reasons and not necessarily for changing compe-
tence levels of presidents or prime ministers. It is, however, noteworthy that there are
systematically higher values for developing countries and new democracies compared to
most established OECD democracies.8 These results are, therefore, taken as an indi-
cation for a more dispersed competence distribution within the pool of candidates in
developing countries and new democracies.
8 Two exceptions are Italy and Japan (see Appendix A). Italy was excluded from the sample of
Western European democracies because the s.d. for government effectiveness and regulatory quality
may not be meaningful for a country which had 65 governments since 1945. I do not have an explanation
for the large s.d. for Japan.
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Table 1: Volatility Differences between Country Groups
Notes: The numbers in the table indicate by how many percent the standard deviation
for Latin American countries (or New Democracies) exceeds the standard deviation for
Western Europe (or US+Canada).
III A Disinformation Model with Reputation Costs
The model captures an incumbent who can improve her re-election chances because a
share ψ of the electorate is susceptible to government manipulations. The government
in power has two instruments for appearing more competent: (i) it can increase deficit-
financed transfers before elections and cut transfers to repay the pre-election deficit after
elections; and (ii) it can reduce the deficit perception by spreading disinformation. The
government incurs a reputation cost after elections, if the dissemination of disinformation
is detected. An alternative model with contemporaneous budgetary costs to disinforma-
tion produces similar results, but is not shown here. Note that the way of modelling
costs to disinformation does not affect the results qualitatively. Both models share that
every alternate period an incumbent politician and a challenger representing different
parties run for office. Politicians’ motivation is purely opportunistic. Nonetheless, vot-
ers’ utility does not hinge on economic considerations alone, but also on a more or less
strong personal predisposition or sympathy for one of the candidates.9
9 Henceforth the terms voter and individual (agent) are used interchangeably. Similarly, the terms
politician and policymaker are used as synonyms. Furthermore, we associate the incumbent with party
a and the challenger with party b without limiting the generality of the analysis.
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III.A Preferences, budget constraint and competence
The expected utility function for any voter i reflects both economic and non-economic
components:
U it =
∞∑
s=t
(βi)s−tEs[cs + αθizs]. (1)
The economic component cs (consumption) and the sympathy component θ
izs are additively-
separable with relative weight α in each period. Es captures the expectations operator.
Discount factor βi does not affect the results – as can be seen later on. To keep the
model tractable, another simplification is that utility is linear in consumption.10 Utility
derived from sympathy is constrained to θizs ∈ [−12 , 12 ] since zt is either −12 (when party
a is elected) or +1
2
(when party b is elected); and the personal sympathy parameter θi
is uniformly distributed over the interval [−1, 1].11 The sympathy component represents
any attribute of the candidates that does not affect economic policies, be it their stance
on societal issues or their good looks.
Both politicians j = a, b face a utility function similar to the one for voters consisting,
again, of an economic and a non-economic component. The non-economic component is,
however, different and includes both a political rent and a political cost. The politician’s
expected utility function is thus:
10 Explicitly capturing discounting and decreasing marginal utility in consumption (convex indiffer-
ence curves) would not affect the results of this paper. As for the possibility of result reversion in
Proposition 3, this can be seen from the graphical illustration (Figure 3 in Appendix E) of the resulting
maximisation problem (E.1).
11 If individual i has somewhat more sympathies for party a, say at θi = − 12 , then her utility derived
from sympathy is positive ( 14 ), if party a is elected (zi = − 12 ); but it is negative (− 14 ), if party b is
elected (zi =
1
2 ).
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V jt =
∞∑
s=t
(βj)s−tEs[cs + IsX − Is−1λsPs] j = a, b. (2)
Ir =

1 if in power in period r
0 otherwise
The policymaker receives exogenous ego rent X only, if she is in power in period s. She
incurs a cost, if it is discovered in that period that she was spreading disinformation as
an incumbent in the previous period (s−1) and, thereby, influencing the previous period
deficit perception of share ψ of the electorate (the uninformed voters). The expected
disutility depends on exogenous detection probability λs and endogenous propaganda
costs in money terms, Ps. There is a one-to-one relationship between Ps and the incum-
bent’s optimal choice of the manipulation of deficit perception in the previous period
(to be modelled further down). For simplicity, we make three assumptions: (i), voters
are willing to punish the incumbent, but do not (want to) remember the incumbent’s
dishonesty for more than one period (see also footnote 14); (ii), the magnitude of propa-
ganda costs does not depend on whether the previous period incumbent is still in power
or lost the elections; and (iii), the policymaker’s discount factor βj will be ignored in the
analysis later on.12
Voters’ and politicians’ consumption alike are constrained by each agent’s constant net-
of-tax income y and period-specific transfers Tt:
ct = y + Tt. (3)
12 As for (ii), those costs may be different in nature: if in power, costs may accrue due to the loss
of political capital; if out of power, these costs may have more to do with diminished revolving-door
opportunities. As for (iii), we shall see later on that the model can be split into 2-period election cycles
(also because of assumption (i)); then the explicit inclusion of the discount rate does not contribute
to substance nor exposition. Note that the latter two assumptions do not affect the model results
qualitatively.
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The government budget constraint is
Tt = Dt −R(Dt−1) + ηjt . (4)
Transfers are deficit-financed intertemporal transfers, not income redistribution. Pro-
viding additional government subsidies or benefits enables the policymaker in power to
appear more competent since current period skills are not observable (notwithstanding
that current skills can be deduced by informed voters; see Appendix C, equation C.3).
Transfers depend on current deficit, Dt, minus repayment for (accumulated) previous
deficit, R(Dt−1), but they are also affected by the incumbent’s positive or negative com-
petence shock.13 Repayment function R(Dt−1) is assumed to be common knowledge and
has some intuitive properties which guarantee that the government wants to repay the
deficit as quickly as possible: R(0) = 0, R′(0) = 1, and R′′(Dt−1) > 0 for all Dt−1 ≥ 0.
Competence ηjt consists of a skills shock for the current period and another one for the
previous period:
ηjt = µ
j
t + µ
j
t−1. (5)
Hence competence persistence is modelled as an MA(1) process.14 Each skills shock µjt
is an i.i.d. random variable with mean 0, distribution function F (µjt) = F (•), F (0) = 12 ,
and density function f(µjt) = f(•) = F ′(•) which is (weakly) monotonously increasing
up to the mean.15 Past shocks are common knowledge, but current or future shocks
13 For ηjt > 0, (net) transfers Tt would surpass the net deficit, Dt−R(Dt−1). In a developing country,
we could interpret ηjt as the government’s ability to secure foreign aid, which does not have to be repaid.
In any country, it may also reflect its ability to seize and exploit profitable investment opportunities.
14 Limited persistence is a compromise. It allows some persistence while acknowledging that compe-
tence also changes over time as new tasks for politicians emerge. For persistence longer than 1 period,
the model would not be easily solvable. Rogoff’s (1990) suggestion of an MA(1) process is one of
three conditions for splitting the model into separate 2-period cycles as is so common in this literature.
(The other conditions are the aforementioned assumptions of repayment being costly and politicians’
punishment for cheating being limited to the following period.) See the timing of events on page 17.
15 For more unusual density functions (for instance, with F ′′(µat ) < 0 for some µ
a
t ≤ 0), we could get
ambiguous results. However, the limiting case of F ′′(µat ) = 0 for some µ
a
t ≤ 0 or even over the entire
range (uniform distribution) is acceptable.
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are unknown to both policymakers and private agents. Even the incumbent does not
know her own current competence – an idea suggested by Shi and Svensson (2006) –
because she always faces new tasks and challenges (like the international financial crisis,
the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) negotiations, the refugee crisis, or the Brexit vote in the UK) or she wants to
start new programmes and cannot foresee how efficiently she can manage them. Not
knowing one’s own competence, any incumbent has an incentive to provide additional
transfers in order to appear more competent and increase her re-election chances. Since
policymakers do not have an informational advantage, there is no signalling as in Rogoff
(1990), only moral hazard as in Shi and Svensson (2006).
III.B Government manipulation and timing of events
Recall the government budget constraint 4. Every period, transfers, last period’s deficit
and last period’s competence can be observed by all voters. A share of voters (1 − ψ,
with 0 ≥ ψ ≥ 1) also observes the government’s policy choice of current period deficit,
Dt. If the government policy could be observed by all voters, the government would
gain nothing from manipulating the deficit and from trying to disinform voters in order
to affect their perception of the deficit. The moral hazard problem arises because a
share of voters ψ is uninformed. Not only can they not infer government competence
in election period t, but they can also not form unbiased beliefs about the incumbent’s
performance after elections.16 This is so because the government can affect their per-
ceived deficit, D̂t, by using disinformation. The interdependence between government
propaganda, opposition counter-propaganda, the role of the media and communication
among individuals is ignored; instead the model makes use of the empirical finding of an
incumbency advantage discussed in Section II. Nonetheless, if the deception is detected
16 Hence the solution here is not based on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept, but on subgame
perfect Nash.
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(with probability λ), the incumbent suffers some disutility in the following period (as
captured in the politicians’ utility function 2). It is assumed that propaganda costs Pt+1
increase with the degree of manipulation of perceived deficit D̂t.
Pt+1 = Φ(D̂t), (6)
with Φ′(D̂t) < 0 and Φ′′(D̂t) > 0. However, it is easier to solve this model and interpret
it, when we consider the inverse function:
D̂ := D̂t = D̂(Pt+1). (7)
The incumbent has thus full control over D̂t, the perception of deficit by a share ψ of
voters. She uses disinformation which bears a cost in the following period only, and
only if detected. Nonetheless, equation (7) is referred to as disinformation technology
with Pt+1 ≥ 0 being interpreted as investment. The properties of equation (6) imply
D̂′(Pt+1) < 0 and D̂′′(Pt+1) > 0, i.e. disinformation investment is effective and reduces
the perceived deficit, but with a decreasing marginal effect. Some additional plausible
assumptions are suggested to obtain an interior solution: D̂(0) = D∗ (without disinfor-
mation even uninformed voters base their decision on the correct level of deficit) and
D̂(∞) = 0 (even disinformation cannot make uninformed voters believe in a surplus
instead of a deficit). So, there will always be some disinformation at the optimum.
The timing of events is summarised in Table 2; the reasons why the model can be sliced
into two-period models consisting of an election and an off-election period each is given
further down. Consider the incumbent to whom we refer to as party a without loss of
generality. In election period t, she chooses deficit level Dt, thus providing transfers
Tt for the public according to equation (4). She also decides how much she wants
to manipulate disinformed voters’ deficit perception D̂, thereby being willing to incur
propaganda costs Pt+1 in period t + 1 given detection probability λ and disinformation
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Table 2: The Timing of Events
technology (7). Individuals vote for incumbent or challenger depending on whether their
own utility (which is affected by the incumbent’s competence) is likely to be higher
under one or the other in period (t+ 1), i.e. after the elections. All voters observe past
skills shock µat−1, last period deficit Dt−1, and transfer level Tt. Only informed voters also
observe deficit level Dt and can, therefore, deduce the level of current skills µ
a
t . They can,
therefore, extract some information about the future competence ηat+1 of the incumbent
since ηat+1 = µ
a
t+1 + µ
a
t . Uninformed (disinformed) voters can only form expectations of
current skills, µ̂at , based on perceived deficit D̂(Pt+1). Then, all voters cast their vote
based on their different beliefs and information sets. What matters is that some voters
can be disinformed by the incumbent.
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In period (t+1), the winner (incumbent or challenger) takes office and receives exogenous
ego rentX. If re-elected, the period t incumbent suffers disutility Pt+1 for the propaganda
she spread in period t with probability λ. Voters are no longer relevant for the period
(t+ 1) policymaker’s decision making because they cannot vote in period (t+ 1) (and in
voting period (t + 2) they will be concerned about the incumbent’s future competence,
not about her past behaviour). Politicians have no incentive for manipulating the deficit
and/or disinforming voters in (t + 1). They want to repay the previous period deficit
because the deficit is costly17 and voters cannot sanction the policymaker for reducing
transfers, i.e. effectively levying additional taxes to finance deficit repayment. Given
that voters are only concerned about politicians’ competence after the election it does
not matter that individuals anticipate in election period t that any politician will repay
the deficit in the off-election period (t + 1). Note also that voters do not consider
expected utility in (t + 2) in their voting decision in t, because even informed voters
cannot distinguish between the incumbent and her challenger in (t + 2) (competence
is an MA(1) process only). Politicians, too, are not concerned about the more distant
future, because they have no instrument for affecting utility or re-election chances in
(t + 2). Nonetheless, (t + 2) and (t + 3) form a new election cycle, possibly with more
sceptical voters and higher propaganda costs, but the same qualitative results.
III.C Solution
The model is solved in four steps – with details given in the appendix. First, we can
determine the probability that an individual agent votes for incumbent a. The proba-
bility depends on whether a voter expects the incumbent or the challenger to deliver a
17 Repayment is guaranteed, technically, because the marginal utility of additional deficit (through its
1-for-1 effect on transfers and, finally, on consumption) is 1 (given that the discount factor is assumed
to be 1), whereas the marginal cost (R′(D)) and, therefore, the marginal disutility is greater than 1.
The unity marginal utility assumption is also used by Shi and Svensson (2006) for the same purpose
as here, albeit with respect to the public goods consumption. – With less restrictive assumptions, we
could get a rising trend in debt.
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higher level of utility after the elections. This depends on two components: (i) on the
individual’s sympathy θi towards the candidates; and (ii) on who is expected to deliver
more transfers next period which, in turn, depends on the then relevant skill shock of
challenger a and incumbent b, ηjt+1 = µ
a
t+1 + µ
a
t , j = a, b. Individuals know nothing
about either politician’s future skills shock, µjt+1; nor do they know anything about the
challenger’s current skills shock, µbt ; they may, however, have expectations on the incum-
bent’s current skills shock (Et[µ
a
t ]) based on her performance in office in period t. It is
shown in the appendix that an individual agent votes for incumbent a, if the following
inequality (which corresponds to (B.6) in Appendix B) holds:
Et[µ
a
t ] > αθ
i. (8)
Even if incumbent a is expected to be (slightly) less skilled than average, an individual
will still vote for incumbent a, if the voter is sufficiently sympathetic towards the incum-
bent (remember that θi < 0 indicates sympathy for party a and α is a positive weight.)
Conversely, even if a voter is sympathetic towards the challenger (θi > 0), the incumbent
could still be chosen, if the incumbent is expected to exhibit sufficiently strong (above
average) competence in the current period.
Second and on this basis, we can derive the probability for the incumbent to win the
election, i.e. obtain more than 50 percent of the votes, for a given level of transfers,
which depends on the deficit level, the disinformation investment and the competence
level of the incumbent. Here is the probability for the incumbent to win the election
(same as (C.1) in Appendix C):
Prob
 (1− ψ) [
Einft [µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
informed
+ψ [
Edisinft [µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
disinformed
≥ 1
2
 . (9)
The probability depends on whether informed voters (share(1 − ψ)) and disinformed
voters (share ψ) think that the incumbent’s skills are above average (Et[µ
a
t ] > 0) or
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not. The difference for informed and disinformed voters occurs because informed voters
have all information for deducing µat from the period t transfer equation (4), unlike
disinformed voters who have to use their perception of the incumbent’s deficit in period
t, D̂t. Disinformed voters overestimate the incumbent’s competence by Dt− D̂t. On this
basis, we can derive the incumbent’s probability of winning (identical to (C.5) and (C.6)
in the appendix):
Prob
{
µat ≥ ψ (D̂t −Dt)
}
(10)
= 1 − F [ ψ (D̂t −Dt)] , (11)
where F (•) is the distribution function of the skills shock. It can be seen that produc-
ing (or increasing) a deficit and reducing the perception thereof raises the government’s
chance of being re-elected above 50%. The incumbent who is ex ante uncertain about
her competence will try to appear more competent by increasing transfers which also
increases the deficit while at the same time trying to invest in disinformation, thereby
reducing the disinformed voters’ perception of the deficit relative to the actual (equilib-
rium) level of deficit. Note that the aforementioned equations, therefore, also show that
the incumbent can increase her winning probability even in equilibrium. See Proposition
1.
Third, we can maximise the incumbent’s expected utility over any 2-period cycle, i.e.
period t utility plus period (t + 1) utility in case of winning the election multiplied by
the probability of winning (as determined in step 2) plus period t + 1 utility in case of
losing multiplied by the probability of losing. For simplicity (as suggested before), let us
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assume that discount factor β = 1.
maxDt,Pt+1 V = maxDt,Pt+1 V
a
t + V
a
t+1 =
maxDt,Pt+1 Et{y +Dt + ηat +X}
+ Et{ [1− F [ψ(D̂ −Dt)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. incumbent wins
[y −R(Dt) + ηat+1 +X − λt+1Pt+1]}
+ Et{ [F [ψ(D̂ −Dt)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. incumbent loses
[y −R(Dt) + ηbt+1 − λt+1Pt+1]} (12)
To characterise the optimal level of deficit and disinformation investment we derive two
first order conditions (FOCs; equivalent to (D.2) and (D.3) in Appendix D):
1 − R′(D∗t ) + ψ F ′[ψ(D̂ −D∗t )] X = 0, (13)
− λt+1 − ψD̂′ F ′[ψ(D̂ −D∗t )] X = 0, (14)
where F ′[•] = f [•] refers to the probability density function. The maximisation problem
can also be illustrated graphically (see Figure 3 in Appendix E). As for the interpre-
tation of the first FOC, 1 − R′(D∗t ) is the marginal direct net effect of deficit, which is
negative, because deficit including repayment is costly. Deficit is optimally chosen by the
government, when the negative marginal direct net effect equals the positive marginal
effect on the expected ego rent. This is the impact of a marginal change of deficit on
competence and, thereby, on the probability of receiving the ego rent (the marginal win-
ning probability), multiplied by the share of disinformed voters times the ego rent. The
second FOC is similar with two differences: (i), the negative marginal direct effect of dis-
information investment equals −λ, the probability of being detected in the post-election
period; and (ii), the positive indirect effect through competence now also depends on the
effect of disinformation on perceived deficit ψD̂′, where D̂′ is the negative slope of the
disinformation technology at the equilibrium. Given F ′[•] > 0 it is clear from the FOCs
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that it is optimal for the government to always use both its instruments, i.e. manipulate
the deficit and disinform voters. For λ = 0 unrealistically, propaganda would be costless
and hence used without bounds, thus producing D̂(∞) = D̂′(∞) = 0, which would imply
that deficit manipulations are maximally effective.
Forth, perturbation results are obtained by using the Implicit Function Theorem (see
Appendix F). We are interested in marginal effects of changes in the political rent X,
detection probability λ or of shifts between the two groups of voters on the government’s
optimal choice both of the deficit D∗ (in t) and of its investment in propaganda P ∗ (in
t+ 1).
IV Results and Discussion
Before studying perturbation results, let us go back to equation (11), which tells us
that the incumbent’s probability of getting re-elected depends on the wedge between the
deficit perceived by disinformed voters, D̂, and the equilibrium deficit D∗t .
Proposition 1. - Re-election Chances.
Manipulations by the incumbent are effective in that they increase the incumbent’s vote
share.
Proof: Simple inspection of equation (11); see also discussion thereof on page 21.
The proposition corroborates evidence by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Aidt,
Veiga and Veiga (2011) and de Haan and Klomp (2013b) who find that politico-economic
machinations positively influence re-election chances. Boylan (2008) and Aidt, Veiga
and Veiga (2011) even find evidence for a ”close election bias”, i.e. that government
manipulations increase, if the election is closely contested.
The effects of changing the ego rent and detection probability are much more straigh-
forward:
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Proposition 2. - Some Obvious Results: Ego Rents and Detection Probability.
A. Higher political rents increase optimal borrowing and disinformation investment at
the equilibrium:
( i)
dD∗
dX
> 0 ( ii)
dP ∗
dX
> 0.
B. Higher probability of being found out to use disinformation leads to shifts from
disinformation investment to borrowing at the equilibrium:
( iii)
dD∗
dλ
> 0 ( iv)
dP ∗
dλ
< 0.
Proof: See appendix F.
As for part A, if the ego rent of being in power increases, then, intuitively, the incentive
to distort the economy also increases. The incumbent is more willing to incur the costs
both for increasing the deficit (repayment cost R(Dt)) and for lowering the perception of
the deficit (viz. increasing disinformation cost Pt+1) in order to appear more competent
in the eye of voters. Result (i) confirms the theoretical and empirical finding obtained
in Shi and Svensson (2006). Result (ii) extends the same logic to the disinformation
instrument. In part B, we make one of the two instruments more expensive and get the
standard result of a shift from the more costly disinformation instrument (result (iv)) to
the less costly deficit instrument (result (iii)). As already shown by first order conditions
(13) and (14) it is, however, always optimal to use both instruments, at least to some
degree.
The effects of changing the share of disinformed voters are ambiguous:
Proposition 3. - Changing the Share of Voters Who Are Susceptible to Disinformation.
A. A larger share of voters who are susceptible to disinformation increases optimal bor-
rowing and disinformation at the equilibrium, if and only if the competence density
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function is relatively inelastic at the equilibrium:18
( i)
dD∗
dψ
> 0 ( ii)
dP ∗
dψ
> 0.
B. If and only if the competence density function is relatively elastic at the equilibrium,
the results reverse:
( iii)
dD∗
dψ
< 0 ( iv)
dP ∗
dψ
< 0.
Proof: See appendix F.
This result can only be explained because the chance of winning the election can be
affected by the government. The competence distribution actually determines how ef-
fective government manipulations are in increasing the incumbent’s re-election chances.
Consider an increase of the share of disinformed voters ψ at the equilibrium. This
increases the chance of winning ceteris paribus (the effect of increasing ψ), but may
increase or decrease the marginal winning probability F ′[µat ] at the equilibrium19 and
thus require reoptimisation. If increasing government manipulations lead to a decrease
in the marginal winning probability, then the overall effect would be ambiguous. With a
very strong reduction of the marginal probability of winning, additional manipulations
by the policymaker may become ineffective. More voters could be manipulated, but the
effect per voter would be reduced too much. As a consequence, the policymaker may
want to do the opposite; she may want to reduce costly repayment costs, i.e. lower the
deficit, instead of increasing it. This means a dampening of the political budget cycle.
18 Inelastic at the equilibrium means that the competence density function f [ψ(D̂ −D∗t )] (= F ′[µat ])
responds little to changes in competence (relative to the density-competence ratio at the equilibrium).
This is required for satisfying the ”if and only if” condition (15) below.
19 The marginal winning probability was already mentioned in the discussion of FOC (13). It is
determined by the slope of the competence distribution function F at the equilibrium. A change of the
marginal winning probability refers to the change of the slope.
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The ”if and only if” condition (see Appendix F) for obtaining the results of part A of
Proposition 3 can be written as
F ′[ψ(D̂ −D∗t )] + ψF ′′[ψ(D̂ −D∗t )](D̂ −D∗t ) > 0. (15)
It is clear that the first term is positive and the second one typically negative (and
always non-positive) as long as D̂ < D∗t (while taking note of the (weak) monotonicity
assumption for F ′ up to the mean, see page 15). For F ′′[•] = 0, for instance if the
distribution is uniform, the second term completely vanishes and condition (15) holds.
The second term also disappears, if D̂ = D∗t in equilibrium, i.e. all agents (including
those who are susceptible to disinformation) would correctly perceive the actual deficit.
This would be the case for prohibitive disinformation costs which make it impossible for
the incumbent to increase her re-election chances by trying to appear more competent
than she actually is. She would not even try to manipulate the deficit. This case is very
different from a seemingly similar situation in Shi and Svensson (2006). In their paper,
D̂ = D∗t at the equilibrium is not an outcome, but an assumption. They postulate that
the government would increase the deficit to cheat on voters because they are uninformed
and can, therefore, not observe the deficit ex ante. However, in their model those same
uninformed voters are, nonetheless, able to rationally anticipate the correct deficit in
equilibrium, although they cannot extract the relevant information anywhere.20 As a
result, the government does manipulate the deficit, but cannot increase its re-election
chances because D̂ = D∗t at the equilibrium and the critical competence value always
remains at its mean of zero. All this is an artifact of their model assumptions and implies
20 That is why there are conceptual objections. Grossman (1977), for instance, argues that informed
and uninformed agents must hold different beliefs in equilibrium. His assertion was made in the context
of a financial market model. According to Grossman, informed and uninformed agents can only hold
identical beliefs in equilibrium, if there is an observable economic variable, which contains the entire
information the uninformed agent could otherwise not have observed. In his model, a price may (or
may not) fulfil this role, but in Shi and Svensson’s (2006) model there is no such variable which would
allow the uninformed voters to extract the relevant information.
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that the possibility of reverse results according to Proposition 3, part B, is ruled out in
their model.
In contrast, a key result of this paper is that an increase in voters who are susceptible to
disinformation does not necessarily lead to a larger budget cycle. Condition (15), which
guarantees larger cycles when the share of voters who are susceptible to disinformation
is increased (see also discussion in Appendix F), basically occurs when the competence
is very dispersed and its density function very flat. For F ′′ > 0, condition (15) can be
rewriten as
F ′
F ′′
> ψ(D∗t − D̂) (16)
which simplifies under standard distributional assumptions to:
• σ2 > [ψ(Dt − D̂)]2 in case of a normal distribution;
• b > [ψ(Dt − D̂)] in case of a Laplace distribution;
• a > 2[ψ(Dt − D̂)] in case of a triangular distribution.21
21 These simplifications relate to symmetrical distributions with the following properties: normal dis-
tribution with mean 0, variance σ2 and density function f(µat ) = f(µ) =
1
2piσ2 e
−µ2
2σ2 ; Laplace distribution
(double exponential distribution) with mean 0, variance 2b2 and density function f(µat ) = f(µ) =
1
2be
µ
b
(for µ < 0); triangular distribution with support [-a,a], mean 0, variance a
2
6 and density function
f(µat ) = f(µ) =
µ+a
a2 .
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Figure 1: Normal and Laplace distributions with different b’s and σ’s
(Note that µ refers to the mean in the graph, but to government com-
petence in the main text and in Footnote 21.)
Note that condition 16 simplifies to a similar expression for each one of the aforemen-
tioned probability distributions:
V ariance > gdist(manip). (17)
The effect (function gdist depending on each distribution) of the manipulation manip
on the critical competence value must be smaller than the variance of the competence
distribution. Suppose voters belief that the distribution of government competence is
very condensed, i.e. the density function is concentrated near the mean (small σ or b or
a). In this case, the condition is only fulfilled, if manipulations of deficit and perceived
deficit are very small in the equilibrium, i.e. (Dt − D̂) small. The more dispersed the
government competence is believed to be, the more likely is it that we obtain the intuitive
result of Proposition 3, part A.
Proposition 3 leads to testable empirical predictions. Suppose competence were really
more dispersed in developing countries and newly democratic countries as suggested
in Section II. Then we could test within each country group the impact of having
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different shares of voters who are (fully) informed about the deficit. As a proxy for
informedness one might use the level of education or the availability of smart phone.
Within the group of developing or newly democratic countries, those countries with a
higher share of dis informed voters (for instance, less education) should exhibit larger
budget cycles compared to other newly democratic or developing countries. Conversely
for advanced OECD democracies, we should not see such a clear-cut effect of changes
in the share of dis informed voters. Advanced OECD countries having a lower level of
eduction compared to other advanced OECD countries should, on average, not exhibit
(much) stronger PBCs. The effects could even go in the opposite direction compared to
those seen for new democracies/developing countries. Furthermore, if the variation in
the magnitude of cycles is larger in non-OECD democracies, then it might be easier to
detect political budget cycles at least in some developing countries or new democracies.
Therefore, this paper may also help explain why political budget cycles are rarely found in
established OECD democracies, but often in developing countries and new democracies.
V Conclusion
The present analysis combines two aspects of government behaviour which seem to be-
long together, but have not been included in one and the same model before. As sug-
gested by Alesina and Roubini with Cohen (1997) it seems plausible that a government,
which is willing to use fiscal policy for manipulating the whole economy, would a for-
tiori also be willing to foster the dissemination of false or misleading information. The
model builds on empirical findings (existence of government disinformation strategies;
incumbency advantage) and produces results which corroborate other empirical findings
(governments’ ability to increase re-election chances through politico-economic manipu-
lations; predominant occurrence of political budget cycles in certain country groups, for
instance developing countries and new democracies).
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Further research could go at least in two directions. As for theoretical modelling, the
disinformation tool could be inserted into a signalling model of the Rogoff (1990) type
where the government observes its competence prior to private agents. How are politi-
cal cycles and re-election chances affected, if both aspects of government behaviour are
included, fiscal signalling and propaganda? As for empirical research, we could test, if
political budget cycles do indeed respond differently – depending on the country group
– to variations in the share of voters who are informed about the deficit. This aforemen-
tioned prediction is based on the model results and the empirical finding that competence
is generally more dispersed in newly democratic countries as well as developing countries
compared to advanced OECD democracies. Within the group of developing or newly
democratic countries, those countries with a higher share of dis informed voters should
thus exhibit larger budget cycles compared to other newly democratic or developing
countries. Conversely for advanced OECD democracies, we should not see such a clear-
cut effect of changes in the share of dis informed voters. This paper lays the foundation
for both possible extensions.
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Appendix and Indications for the Referees
The appendix presents background information for the competence distribution measure
of subsection II.C and indications for the four steps of the model solution plus a graphical
illustration of the maximisation problem.
A Competence distribution measure
The measure for the dispersion of government competence is based on annual data for
Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality, two Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors provided by the World Bank (2016), for the period 1996 to 2014 for a total of 56
countries. A higher value indicates a higher level of government effectiveness or regula-
tory quality, respectively. The indicator values range from -2.5 to 2.5. We calculate the
standard deviation (s.d.) for each country. The results are listed in Tables 3 to 6. It
should be noted by the reader that the summary value given for each region (Western
Europe, new democracies, Latin America) is not an s.d. for the entire region, but the
average of individual countries’ s.d.s within that region. Table 3 depicts Western Europe.
In all countries but one, individual country CVs are very close to the low average for
Western Europe. Tables 4 and 5 show the results for a country group of new democra-
cies as defined by Brender and Drazen (2005) and a country group of Latin American
developing countries, respectively. In both country groups, s.d.s for individual countries
are very diverse, but typically far above the s.d.s for the Western European countries as
well as for the US and Canada, though not the s.d. for Japan – as reported in Table 6.
Table 3: Standard Deviations in Western Europe
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Table 4: Standard Deviations in New Democracies
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Table 5: Standard Deviations in Latin America
Table 6: Standard Deviations in Other Countries
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B Step 1: Probability of voting for the incumbent
In step 1, the probability of voting for the incumbent is derived. We consider an indi-
vidual voter, no matter if informed or susceptible to disinformation with respect to the
deficit level (the latter are henceforth called disinformed voters). She votes for incumbent
a, if
Et[c
a
t+1 + αθ
i(−1
2
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. utility when a in power
> Et[c
b
t+1 + αθ
i(+
1
2
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. utility when b in power
. (B.1)
Depending on who is in power, t+1 consumption will typically differ because of differences
in policymakers’ competence and individuals’ expectations about it:
Et[c
a
t+1] = Et[y] + Et[T
a
t+1]; Et[c
b
t+1] = Et[y] + Et[T
b
t+1]; (B.2)
T jt+1 = −R(Dt) + ηjt+1. (B.3)
Period t + 1 government budget constraint (B.3) says that the period t deficit must be
repaid in period t+1.22 As a result, t+1 transfers are negative (i.e. taxes) corresponding
to deficit repayment modulo the effect of the policymaker’s competence. Individuals have
no idea about the skills shock of either potential policymaker in t+ 1. Nor do they know
the skills shock of the challenger in period t, and, therefore, expect 0. However, they can
use the incumbent’s period t deficit policy to draw conclusions about her skills shock in
period t (see further down).
Et[T
b
t+1] = −Et[R(D∗t )]. (B.4)
Et[T
a
t+1] = −Et[R(D∗t )] + Et[µat ], (B.5)
where D∗t denotes the incumbent’s optimal period t choice for the deficit (to be deter-
mined further down). Combining equations (B.1) to (B.5) we can obtain a condition for
an individual to vote for incumbent a:
Et[µ
a
t ] > αθ
i. (B.6)
Using the distribution of the skills shock we can determine the probability (Pr) of any
voter, be she informed or disinformed, to vote for incumbent a:
Pr[Et[µ
a
t ]− αθi ≥ 0] =
Et[µ
a
t ]− (−α)
α− (−α) =
Et[µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
. (B.7)
22 Remember that policymakers will not borrow in period t+1 because there is no election at the end
of that period. See the discussion in the paragraph on the timing of events on page 17.
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C Step 2: Incumbent’s probability of winning
Now, we can determine the probability Prob that incumbent a obtains 50% of the votes
in period t elections. It is the probability that the number of voters times their individual
probability Pr to vote for incumbent a (as determined in equation B.7) is greater or equal
to 1
2
. However, the individual probability Pr is different for informed and disinformed
voters because their expectations of period t skills, Et[µ
a
t ], differ. Here is the probability
for the incumbent to win the election:
Prob
 (1− ψ) [
Einft [µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
informed
+ψ [
Edisinft [µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
disinformed
≥ 1
2
 . (C.1)
So why is there a difference in expectations for informed and disinformed voters? Con-
sider the government budget constraint for election period t:
Tt = Dt + ηt (C.2)
Remember that policymakers will not borrow or disinform in off-election periods because
appearing more competent does not affect the duration of the incumbent’s time in office.
Without deficit in off-election period (t− 1) there is no repayment in election period t.
Let us now rewrite equation (C.2):
ηt = Tt −Dt
For informed voters we obtain:
Einft [µ
a
t ] = µ
a
t = Tt −Dt − µat−1 (C.3)
The point is that informed voters can determine Einft [µ
a
t ] deterministically, because they
can observe Dt. By contrast, disinformed voters must form an estimate of the incum-
bent’s skills, µ̂at , based on their perceived deficit level, D̂t:
µ̂at = Tt − D̂t − µat−1 or D̂t = Tt − µ̂at − µat−1
µ̂at = Tt −Dt − µat−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µat from (C.3)
+Dt − D̂t
Edisinft [µ
a
t ] = µ
a
t +Dt − D̂t (C.4)
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Disinformed voters overestimate the incumbent’s competence by Dt − D̂t. Using equa-
tions (C.3) and (C.4) we can now determine the probability that incumbent a receives
50% of the votes in period t:
Prob
{
(1− ψ) [µ
a
t
2α
+
1
2
] + ψ [
µat +Dt − D̂t
2α
+
1
2
] ≥ 1
2
}
= Prob
{
µat
2α
+ ψ
Dt − D̂t
2α
+
1
2
≥ 1
2
}
= Prob
{
µat ≥ ψ (D̂t −Dt)
}
(C.5)
= 1 − F [ ψ (D̂t −Dt)] , (C.6)
where F (•) is the distribution function of the skills shock.
Figure 2: Bell-shaped competence density function F ′ as an example
The marked area towards the right (light grey or yellow [if in colour]) under the den-
sity function depicted in Figure 2 corresponds to the probability described by equation
(C.5) and by the distribution function representation in equation (C.6). The expected
competence overall (combine equations C.3 and C.4) is always greater than the actual
competence, if the perceived deficit is smaller than the actual deficit (D̂ < Dt). Then
the probability (see equation (C.6) or the light grey [or yellow] area under the density
function) is always greater than 1
2
. We can see that producing or increasing a deficit
(or reducing D̂, the perception thereof) increases the government’s chance of being re-
elected.
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D Step 3: Incumbent’s maximisation problem
Now, we can maximise incumbent a’s utility over the entire election cycle, i.e. periods
t and t + 1. Period t + 1 utility is the sum of the utilities for winning and losing the
election weighted by the probability determined in step 2:
maxDt,Pt+1 V = maxDt,Pt+1 V
a
t + V
a
t+1 =
maxDt,Pt+1 Et{y +Dt + ηat +X}
+ Et{ [1− F [ψ(D̂ −Dt)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. incumbent wins
[y −R(Dt) + ηat+1 +X − λt+1Pt+1]}
+ Et{ [F [ψ(D̂ −Dt)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. incumbent loses
[y −R(Dt) + ηbt+1 − λt+1Pt+1]}
Given that the incumbent knows her past, but not her present and future skills (and not
the skills shock of the challenger) the maximisation problem looks as follows:
maxDt,Pt+1 y +Dt + µ
a
t−1 +X
+y −R(Dt)− λt+1Pt+1
+[1− F [ψ(D̂ −Dt)]]X (D.1)
Having verified the second order conditions for a well-behaved maximisation problem we
can focus on the two first order conditions (FOCs):
VD = 1 − R′(D∗t ) + ψ F ′[ψ(D̂ −D∗t )] X = 0, (D.2)
VP = − λt+1 − ψD̂′ F ′[ψ(D̂ −D∗t )] X = 0, (D.3)
where F ′[•] = f [•] refers to the probability density function.
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E Illustration of maximisation problem
To get an idea of the maximisation problem we make the following simplifying assump-
tions: equally distributed competence (which means that we cannot obtain reverse results
as suggested by Proposition 3, part B); zero previous period competence (µat−1 = 0); no
chance of being detected (λ = 0) which implies that propaganda is costless and will
be used maximally, thereby ensuring that disinformed voters will believe in zero deficit
(D̂ = 0). The maximisation problem simplifies to:
maxDt,Pt+1 y +Dt +X
+y −R(Dt) + [1− F [ψ(0−Dt)]]X (E.1)
Figure 3: Election cycle optimum, when detection probability λ = 0
Without discount rate the incumbent tries to achieve the highest overall return, i.e.
the (dashed) minus 45◦ line furthest away from the origin. The diagram captures the
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optimum for three situations. If all voters are informed (ψ0 = 0), increasing D has no
effect on winning the elections and will not result in a higher probability of receiving ego
rent X in period 2 (expected future ego rent). The flat ψ0 line depicts the (hypothetical)
period 2 return y + [1 − F [0]]X = y + 1
2
X (for any period 1 return y + X + D), if we
ignore any deficit repayment costs. However, any increase of D will only be painful,
because the repayment in period 2 will be larger than the original D, thereby reducing
the overall return. This is captured by the downward sloping ”total return for ψ0” line
which is tangential to the ψ0 line in E. As a result, the incumbent will choose equilibrium
E. Any increase in the share of disinformed voters ψ will rotate the hypothetical period
2 return curve counterclockwise because the deficit manipulation will now increase the
expected ego rent in period 2, thereby leading to equilibria A (for ψ1) and C (for ψ2).
The graph can also be used to illustrate the difference to the Shi and Svensson (2006)
assumption of rational expectations. Here, point A is the equilibrium for ψ1 since we
assumed (for constructing the figure) that voters believe D̂ = 0. However, if D̂ were
rationally expected, we would end up in point B where there is deficit manipulation, but
without any effect on the expected ego rent in period 2.
F Step 4: Propositions: Perturbation results and the ”if
and only if” condition
Indications on the results of Section 2 and 3:
dD
dX
= − 1|H|
[
VPP
∂VD
∂X
− VDP ∂VP
∂X
]
> 0
dD
dλ
= − 1|H|
[
VPP
∂VD
∂λ
− VDP ∂VP
∂λ
]
> 0
dD
dψ
= − 1|H|
[
VPP
∂VD
∂ψ
− VDP ∂VP
∂ψ
]
(F.1)
dP
dX
= − 1|H|
[
VPD
∂VD
∂X
− VDD ∂VP
∂X
]
> 0
dP
dλ
= − 1|H|
[
VPD
∂VD
∂λ
− VDD ∂VP
∂λ
]
< 0
dP
dψ
= − 1|H|
[
VPD
∂VD
∂ψ
− VDD ∂VP
∂ψ
]
(F.2)
The determinant of the Hessian is |H| = VDDVPP − V 2PD.
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”If and only if” condition (15) requires that the density responds little to changes in
competence (relative to the density-competence ratio at the equilibrium), i.e. the density
function f [ψ(D̂ −D∗t )] (= F ′[µat ]) is inelastic at the equilibrium. Condition (15) can be
rewritten accordingly:
−1 < f ′ψ(D̂ −D
∗
t )
f
⇐⇒ −1 <
df
f
dµat
µat
. (F.3)
Condition (15) is actually the derivative of a derivative:
dd(1−F [ψ(D̂−Dt)])
dD
dψ
> 0, (F.4)
where 1 − F [ψ(D̂ −Dt)] is the (positive) probability of winning and thus receiving the
ego rent; and
d(1− F [ψ(D̂ −Dt)])
dD
= ψF ′[ψ(D̂ −D∗t )] (F.5)
is the (positive) marginal winning probability of deficit D. Inequality F.4 means that a
marginal increase in the share of disinformed voters must increase the marginal winning
probability of D. If D is more productive with respect to obtaining the ego rent, then
the government can afford higher marginal repayment costs R′(Dt) according to FOC
(13). If increasing D is more productive, reducing the perceived deficit D̂ is also more
productive (given that D and D̂ have opposite signs in the density function). According
to FOC (14) the government can thus also afford to increase propaganda investment P
(thereby reducing −D̂′, the absolute value of the marginal perceived deficit).
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